St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 6

Number 2

Article 3

6-1-1974

Defense Counsel and the First Amendment: A Time to Keep
Silence, and a Time to Speak.
Jeffrey Cole
Michael I. Spak

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Cole & Michael I. Spak, Defense Counsel and the First Amendment: A Time to Keep Silence, and a
Time to Speak., 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. (1974).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol6/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Cole and Spak: Defense Counsel and the First Amendment: A Time to Keep Silence,

DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: "A
TIME TO KEEP SILENCE, AND A TIME TO SPEAK."*
JEFFREY COLE**
And
MICHAEL I. SPAK***
In Sheppard v. Maxwell' the Supreme Court importuned the
lower courts to "take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences."
The Court specifically noted that "extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer . . . which divulged prejudicial matters" could be "pro-

scribed" and that "neither prosecutors, counsel for the defense,
[nor] the accused

.

.

.

should be permitted to frustrate [a

court's] function. Mr. Cole and Professor Spak conclude that
rules proscribing extrajudicial comments by counsel of record
made during pending litigation, and for public dissemination, are
perfectly consonant with the first amendment, and that the clear
and present danger test of Schenck v. United States' is not the
measure of the constitutionalityof such rules.
Whether we like it or not, we must accept the fact that the "black
art of publicity" has come to stay; every year adds to its potency and
to the finality of its judgments. The individual is as helpless against
it as the child is helpless against the formulas with which he is indoctrinated. Not only is it possible by -these means to shape his tastes,
feelings, desires and hopes, but it is also possible to convert him into
a fanatical zealot.'
* Ecclesiastes 3:1, 7. "For everything there is a season, and a time for every
purpose under heaven. A time to keep silence, and a time to speak."
** B.S., J.D., 1968; Assistant United States Attorney. Mr. Cole has served as the
Deputy Chief of the Appellate Division and the Assistant Chief of the Criminal Division in the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
He is the author of "Impeachment with Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Coming to Grips with the Perjurous Defendant," 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1971). The
author's views do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Justice.
*** B.S., J.D., LL.M., Northwestern University, 1962; Professor of Law, DePaul
University College of Law. Professor Spak is the author of M. SPAK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MILITARY LAW (Nexus:
1971), and numerous articles on Military and
Constitutional Law.
1. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
2. 249 U.S.47 (1919).
3. L. HAND, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in THE SpIRrr OF LIBERTY 172 (Dillard ed.
1963).
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It is not surprising, then, that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial-"the most fundamental of all freedoms"4 --is
today threatened by excesses committed under the guise of freedom

of speech. Indeed, with increasing frequency courts are importuned
to review convictions in which substantial claims are made that a jury
trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts
exerting pressures upon potential jurors before trial and even during
the course of trial, "thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, -to secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions,
evidence submitted in open court."5
How courts can or should meet this constantly worsening situationO
was considered by the Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell.'

There, the Court decreed that reversals of criminal cases in which
there was prejudicial pretrial publicity are but palliatives and that the
cure lay "in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice

at its inception."' The disturbing realization that many of the prejudicial items that had appeared in the press could be traced to both
the defense and prosecution' prompted the Court to admonish trial
judges to curb prejudicial news at its inception by effective control of
counsel of record as well as of any party, witness, or court personnel
whose comments could affect the outcome of the litigation.' °
4. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
5. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. See Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267
U.S. 598 (1925).
7. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
8. Id. at 363.
9. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States ex rel.
Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 378 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 24142 (1967); Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964).
For a particularly egregious example of misconduct by
a defense attorney, see the New Jersey Supreme Court's discussion of F. Lee Bailey's
behavior in State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1968). Thereafter, Bailey's clients
unsuccessfully sought relief in the federal courts. Matzner v. Brown, 288 F. Supp. 608,
612 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1015
(1970).
10. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court adumbrated the following:
Effective control of [counsel for both defense and prosecution]-concededly within
the court's power-might well have prevented the divulgence of inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations that made up much of the inflammatory
publicity, at least after Sheppard's indictment.
More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial
matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take any
lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the identity of pro-
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The adjuration of Sheppard has given impetus to one of the most
searching debates in recent legal history concerning methods of solving
the problems of fair trial and free press. In 1968 the American Bar
Association's Advisory Committees on Fair Trial and Free Press, and
the Judicial Conference Committee issued similar reports, called the
Reardon" and Kaufman Reports, 2 respectively, after their chairmen.
Both committees sought to implement the mandate of Sheppard by providing a "satisfactory accommodation"" between those interests which
the first and sixth amendments seek to protect. 4 All those involved in
the effort were profoundly aware of the delicacy of their mission, for
they recognized the inevitable tension -that would result from the simul-

taneous application of these two constitutional limitations to the administration of criminal justice. Yet, despite the recondite nature of
the problem, both committees arrived at almost identical results.
One of the major areas in which action was recommended involved
the recommendation that courts place limitations on extrajudicial statements by all counsel in criminal cases. 1 The bilateral nature of the
spective witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence;
or like statements concerning the merits of the case. See State v. Van Duyne,
43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), in which the court interpreted Canon
20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics to prohibit
such statements.
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment
on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process required that
the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given
the pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused.
But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception The courts must
take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the
court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaborationbetween counsel
and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not
only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures.
Id. at 361-63 (emphasis added). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688
(1972). Prior to his appointment as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Louis
Powell had advocated self-imposed professional restraints on attorneys. Powell, The
Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534 (1965).
11. Reardon, The Fair Trial-FreePress Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343 (1968). It has

in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY
7-107 [hereinafter cited as ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE].
been codified

RULE

12. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE
"FRm PRESS-FAiR TRIAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
13. Id. at 393.
14. Id. at 393.
15. The Judicial Conference also recommended that rules be promulgated prohibit-
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suggested restrictions bespeaks the recognition that defense counsel,
no less than counsel for the government, had been guilty of repeated
infractions of ethical standards outlined in ABA Canon 20.10
Notwithstanding the plain mandate of Sheppard, the uncompromising avowal of the Judicial Conference Committee that the courts
unquestionably have the power and the duty to regulate statements by
defense and prosecution lawyers, 7 and the substantial degree of
ing the release of prejudicial information by courthouse personnel and that each district
court provide by local rule for special orders governing the proceedings in any case
in which prejudicial influences might otherwise penetrate into the trial. Id. at 401.
Both the Reardon and Kaufman Committees warned against any attempt to directly
regulate the press itself. The extraordinary problems which are involved in such attempts differ markedly from those encountered when counsel are sought to be restrained. For an analysis of those questions see United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1972); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 490 P.2d 608 (Wash.
1971); Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1973); Sun Co. v. Superior
Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1973); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 483
P.2d 564 (Ariz. 1971).
16. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETICs No. 20 provided:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional
to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond
quotation from the records and papers on file in the Court; 'but even in extreme
cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
See Reardon, The Fair Trial-FreePress Standards,54 A.B.A.J. 343, 344 (1968).
17.

ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FaR

PRESS 77, 102-106 (Tenta-

tive Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; REPORT OF THE CoMmrrran
ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL" IsSUE, 45
F.R.D. 391, 407 (1968). See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 647 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring); State v. Nielsen, 136 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Neb. 1965); In re Bailey, 273 A.2d
563 (N.J. 1971); State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225 (N.J.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924
(1968); State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841 (N.J. 1964). Consequently, it was deemed
desirable to replace Canon 20 with a a more carefully defined constitutional standard.
See Reardon, The Fair Trial-FreePressStandards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 344 (1968).
Prohibition of extrajudicial comment by attorneys in cases in which they are counsel
of record was premised upon the lawyer's professional obligation "to maintain the integrity of the system he helps to administer." ABA STANDARDS 80. Upon this basis, both
the ABA and Judicial Conference Committees commenced their proposed standards
concerning extrajudicial statements by counsel with a series of criteria designed to fulfill constitutional demands:
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize the release of information
or opinion for dissemination by any means of public communication, in connection
with pending or imminent criminal litigation with which he is associated, if there

is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial
or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
ABA STANDARDS 82; REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-FAr TRIAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391, 404 (1968).
This paragraph was "not designed to serve as a basis for the application of sanctions but rather

to state the broad principle underlying the specific restrictions which follow."
STANDARDS 85.

ABA

The relevant restriction that followed was that:

During the trial of any criminal matter, including the period of selection of the
jury, no lawyer associated with the prosecution or defense shall give or authorize
any extrajudicial statement or interview, relating to the trial or the parties or issues
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quasi-legislative consideration that underscored the promulgation of
these rules,' there persists a chorus of strident objections predicated
on the first amendment.
Many of those who have argued against the imposition of restrictions on comments by defense counsel 9 have succumbed to the mischievous tendency whereby beguiling formulas of respect for the first
amendment are made to do service -for critical analysis by being
turned into dogma. Indeed, more often than not, the arguments
against the restrictions are little more than panegyrics to the first
amendment rather than sound and dispassionate analyses. Phillip
Toynbee wrote with specific reference to obscenity and -the law what
can serve as a general commentary on the objections raised by the "free
speech" people:
The smut-hounds are guilty of elevating personal prejudice above
both art and freedom. The art-heretics are guilty of elevating
art above life, the part above the whole, the by-product above
the living process of creation. It is the old argument which divided some of us at the time of Monte Cassino, when the few
held that the monastery should be spared even at the cost of soldiers' lives while the same majority considered this to be the most
odious of blasphemies. Suppose that after an air raid a man had
lain buried under St. Paul's in such a way that he could be rescued only by the demolition of the whole cathedral. Who but
a monster would have hardened his heart against the victim's cries
rather than against the man-made monument above him? And
just as there is a lunatic fringe of art lovers, so there is a lunatic
fringe of libertarianswho hold that the freedom to talk or print
is, in all circumstances, sacrosanct. They would protest against
any action being taken to prevent the publication of anti-Semitic
pamphlets in modern Germany or of incitements to race-violence
iWNotting Hill. It is another heresy which prefers the part to
the whole and attempts to deal with the complexity of life by a
single supreme simplicity.2 0
in the trial, for dissemination by any means of public communication, except that
the lawyer may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the
court in the case.
Id. at 84.
18. In In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971), the court said that when
enacting rules of practice, "courts should be treated more like legislatures than courts
in that their rule-making decisions should be subject to the same sorts of challenges
permitted for statutes." Id. at 114.
19. No one seems especially concerned about the prosecutor's right of free speech.
The feeling apparently is that the sixth amendment justifies restricting his extrajudicial
comments. However, a corresponding responsibility should be imposed on defense
counsel.
20. Toynbee, Two Kinds of Extremism, London Observer, Feb. 8, 1959, at 20, col.
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Since the salient objection to restrictions on defense counsel's extrajudicial comments invariably is pressed in terms of the clear and present danger test, it is appropriate to demonstrate the inapplicability of

the danger formula to rules which regulate extrajudicial comment by
counsel in criminal cases. The following is not an attempt to articulate the sound policy considerations which support the ABA and Judicial Conference Committee rules. Rather, we have sought to dem-

onstrate that there are no constitutional impediments to local rules of
practice which rely upon their precepts.
THE DEMISE OF CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. . . . All in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached. . . . The boundary
at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined
by any general formula in advance .... 1

When Mr. Justice Holmes came to the Supreme Court,2 2 the contours of the first amendment were largely undefined.

ions-a mere

handful 23-he

By a few opin-

gave philosophical direction to the inert

ideas of a paper guarantee of freedom. 24

From the outset the Justice

labored to articulate that spirit of tolerance and moderation upon
which the first amendment rested.25 For him the interest which the
5-6, quoted in P. FREUND, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRiBUTE
158 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
21. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes,
J.).
22. Holmes was commissioned in December, 1902.
23. See Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (Holmes, J.,dissenting);
Schaeffer v. United States, 251' U.S. 466 (1920) (Holmes, J.,dissenting); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J.,dissenting); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
24. 'Every institution,' wrote Emerson, 'is the lengthened shadow of one man.'
The observation is nowhere borne out more strikingly than in judicial doctrines,
which often exert an influence truly institutional in scope. An outstanding example in the field of American public law is . .. afforded by Justice Holmes' personal responsibility for the 'clear and present danger' formula ....
Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NoTRE DAME LAw. 325 (1952).
25. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). To the end of
his life, he never faltered in his belief that the degree, in fact, to which a state permits
criticism of its authority is the surest index to its hold upon the allegiance of the community. In the last dissent he wrote Mr. Justice Holmes said:
[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for
those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate.
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929).
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amendment was designed to protect presupposed that the dominant
opinion prevailing at any given time may be wrong and that the most
26
effective way to correct it is freedom of criticism and protest.
Holmes allowed speech to be punished only when a "clear and present danger" of harm was likely to result from the expression of the
opinion and where there was no chance for effective counterargument. 27 "If there be time to expose -through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."'2 ,
Following Holmes' departure from the bench, the Supreme Court
demonstrated its sensitivity to the truth-that the clear and present
danger test is an oversimplified judgment unless it takes account also
of a number of other factors. No matter how easily the phrase "clear
and present danger" is uttered, it is not a substitute for the weighing
of values.29
Even in the seminal cases concerning press interference with a fair
trial, the Court emphasized that in using the term clear and present
danger it was not expressing, even remotely, an absolutist test nor did
it have in mind a danger in the abstract; these cases demonstrate the
Court's recognition that the danger test is not a substitute for the
weighing of values or a formula susceptible of automatic application.
For example, in Bridges v. California,80 the Court unhesitatingly
avowed that while clear and present danger is "a working principle"
which affords "practical guidance" in certain kinds of first amendment cases," the answers to the delicate problems involved in such
26. Writing to Harold Laski of the Debs case, he said:
When people are putting out all their energies in battle I don't think it unreasonable to say we won't have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising troops

-by persuasion any more than by force. But in the main I am for aeration of
all effervescing convictions-there is no way so quick for letting them get flat.
HOLMES--LAsKI LETrERS 203-204 (Howe ed. 1953) (emphasis added). See also F.
FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 49 (1938).

27. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
28.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)

(Brandeis, Holmes, JJ., concur-

ring).
29. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28, quoted in L
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 60-61 (1958).
30. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In this case, Bridges, a labor union official, sent a telegram to a local newspaper stating that the judge's decision in a case involving a labor
dispute was "outrageous," was likely to tie up ports along the Pacific Coast, and would
not be followed by the union. Id. at 276. For this conduct, Bridges was held in contempt of court. The story of the Bridges decision and the roles played by Justices

Frankfurter and Murphy is told in J. HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE
BIOGRAPHY (1968).
31. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941).
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cases "cannot be completely captured in a formula," for, any formula,
32
"however helpful, does not comprehend the whole problem.
In Pennekamp v. Florida,3 the Court recognized that the danger
formula inevitably had the vice of uncertainty and acknowledged that
"[n]o definition could give an answer" to "[w]hat is meant by clear
and present danger to a fair administration of justice. '34 It was,
however, unflinching in its avowal that under any one of the phrases
which had been employed in various opinions,15 reviewing courts are
asked, in cases of this type, ,to appraise the statement by balancing
the desirability of free discussion against the necessity for fair adjudication, free from interruption of its processes.8" The Court found
that it must "weigh the right of free speech which is claimed by the
petitioners against the danger of the coercion and intimidation of
courts,' 3 7 and that the impact of the words must be weighed against
the protection given by the principles of the first amendment to public
comment on pending court cases.3 8 Pennekamp, therefore, reaffirmed what Bridges intimated-that the phrase, "clear and present
danger," is not self-defining but "involves in every case a comparison
89
between interests which are to be appraised qualitatively.
Notwithstanding these precepts of caution, the phrase clear and
present danger became so deeply ingrained in judicial consciousness
that the mere invocation of the formula obscured the considerations
which gave it birth and guided its development as well as 'the nature
of the questions which Holmes found "convenient to consider in terms
of clear and present danger. '40 Thus, the Supreme Court itself has
come to recognize that the term was a mechanical test which erroneously
32. Id. at 261.
33. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
34. Id. at 348.
35. The Court noted that whether there must be "a clear and present or a grave

and immediate danger, a real and substantial threat, one which is close and direct or
one which disturbs the court's sense of fairness" is dependent solely upon semantics.
Id. at 336.
36. Id. at 336.
37. Id. at 346.
38. Id. at 349.
39. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), af 'd, 341 U.S.

494 (1951).

40. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950),

quoting

Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). Ironically, Holmes himself regarded it as "one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases
and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis."

Hyde v. United

States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Holmes, Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443, 455 (1899).
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placed form over substance.41 It is the considerations that gave birth to
the phrase clear and present danger, not the phrase itself, that are vital

in deciding questions involving liberties protected by the first amendment.42
Today, when there is a constitutional challenge to a legislative enactment which seeks to reconcile conflicting constitutional rights, the
clear and present danger test has no application. Rather, a sophisti-

cated balancing test is employed to determine the permissibility of the
endeavor.

Hence, to admit that governmental action may affect free-

dom of speech, is to establish the condition for, not to arrive at the
conclusion of, constitutional decision. 43 Against the impediments
which particular governmental action creates to individual liberty,
there must be weighed the value to the public of the ends which the

regulation may achieve."

Some compromise is therefore necessary

lest "in the clash of jarring rivalries the pretending absolutes will destroy themselves and ordered freedom too.""

The Court's awareness that "the societal value of speech must...
be subordinated to other values and considerations, 46 finds expression
41. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950). A year
later, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) would help to dissipate the brooding omnipresence which the danger formula, in its pristine form, represented and
against which Justice Frankfurter had so bitterly inveighed. See, for example, Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 384 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 351 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 296 (1941).
42. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950).
43. This inexorably follows when it is realized that whatever promise the "preferred position" argument once held as an organon for judging, it has been laid to rest
by more recent developments. Compare United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967); Koningsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cf. Rowan v. United
States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 470 (2d Cir. 1963); Dietemann v.
Time Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 929 (C.D. Calif. 1968). See also Will, Free Press v.

Fair Trial, 12

DEPAUL

L. REV. 197, 199 (1963).

44. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969); Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1961); United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947); cf. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.,
474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973) "Any informational value in a statement violative . . .
[of the "anti-blockbusting" provision of the Fair Housing Act of 1968] is clearly outweighed by the government's overriding interest in preventing blockbusting." Id. at
122.
45. CARDOZO, Mr. Justice Holmes, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 12 (Frankfurter ed.
1931). But see Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933).
46. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951). See also Grayned v. City
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in the decisions regarding conflicts between first amendment interests
and legislative investigatory needs. In those cases, the Court has required the sacrifice of first amendment freedoms if, on balance, the
legislative need for information is compelling.47
The cases dealing with a public employee's freedom of expression
are also instructive. In Goldwasser v. Brown,48 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit recognized both the right of a public employee
to speak freely and the interest of the employer in the efficient dispatch of its business. It acknowledged that "[wihere there is tension
between the two, accommodation must be sought in the balancing
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). For example, in Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court said:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as abolutes. Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when
and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the advocates are involved. By
adjustment of rights, we can have both lull liberty of expression and an orderly
life.
Id. at 642-44 (emphasis added).
More recently, the Court sustained, against a first amendment attack, Title III of
the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 under which a person may require
that a mailer remove his name from its mailing lists and stop all future mailings to
him. The petitioner contended that the statute violated his constitutional right to communicate. Mr. Chief Justice Burger responded that "the right of every person 'to be
let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate." After "[w]eighing the highly important right to communicate . . . against the very basic
right to be free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter. .. " the Court concluded that
a "mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee."
Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 733-37 (1970).
47. See DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 82629 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-67 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 187-88 (1957); United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953).
Not wholly unrelated to the problems encountered in the legislative investigation
cases is that presented in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). There, the Court
was faced with the constitutionality of a statute which required a motorist to stop at
the scene of an accident and give his name and address. In response to a fifth amendment challenge, the Chief Justice, speaking for the plurality, recognized that:
[t]ension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the
right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand,
and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest
can be treated lightly.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added). See also Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972)
(balancing in sixth amendment context); United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) (balancing in fourth amendment context); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967) (balancing in fourth amendment context);
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) ("The problem is one that calls for
balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense."); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C.
1972) (balancing in first amendment context); Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 878 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (balancing in first amendment context).
48. 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
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process which not infrequently characterizes the task of constitutional
interpretation." 49 Similarly, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.50 eschewed

any reliance on clear and present danger in assessing the protection
afforded to certain statements by an employer to his employees.

Speaking for the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren said that "an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to
associate freely, .

. and any balancing of those rights must take into

account the"
special and unique relationship between employees and
51

employer.

In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Brodhurst5 2 the federal

district court sustained a conviction against a newspaper editor for
publishing the names of certain children under the jurisdiction of the
court in violation of a statute which proscribed such publication without court authorization.5" While paying lip service to the clear and
present danger rule, the court relied extensively on American Communications Association v. Douds 4 and, in the last analysis, resorted

to balancing. 55

This same approach was employed to sustain a Wisconsin statute

making it a criminal offense for any person to publish the name or
identity of the victim of rape "except as

. .

.may be necessary in the

institution or prosecution of any civil or criminal court proceeding
"56

The pertinent argument against the facial constitutionality of

49. Id. at 1176 (emphasis added); see Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 74142 (9th Cir. 1970); Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 859 (5th Cir.
1969); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Education, 363 F.2d 749, 753-54 (5th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1962); Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D.S.C. 1969); cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 567, 570 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 227 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961); Dietemann v. Time Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 929
(C.D. Calif. 1968). See also Central Hardware v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972).
50. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
51. Id. at 617.
52. 285 F. Supp. 831 (D.V.I. 1968).
53. Id. at 834.
54. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
55. In so doing the court in Brodhurst considered that:
[liegitimate attempts to protect the public, not from the remote possible effects of
of noxious ideologies, but from present excesses of direct active conduct are not presumptively bad because they interfere with and in some of their manifestations restrain the exercise of First Amendment rights. In essence, the problem is one of
balancing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right
of speech and assembly against the legislative determination that certain evil conduct should be suppressed.
Government of Virgin Islands v. Brodhurst, 285 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D.V.I. 1968).
56. State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Wis. 1948). Florida, Georgia and South
Carolina have similar statutes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.02 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. §
26-2105 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-81 (1962).
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the statute was that it did not require a prerequisite showing of clear
and present danger. In rejecting the contention, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the question of whether there is a clear and
present danger which would justify the legislature in prescribing this
limitation on the freedom of the press was one involving a consideration of matters relating to public policy.5 7 It concluded with the
forceful assertion that when the detriment to the victim of the crime
was weighed against the benefit derived by 'the public from the publication, there could be no doubt that the slight statutory restriction
of the freedom of the press was fully justified."'
This sampling makes it manifest that the clear and present danger
test has fallen into desuetude. Indeed, in no recent Supreme Court
decision has the test been employed, nor has it been employed to test
the facial constitutionality of a statute. More significantly, with one
apparent exception, "9 the test has not commanded the approval of the
majority of any court of review in the context presented by extrajudicial comments of counsel in pending criminal litigation.60
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE CONTEXT
OF EXTRAJUDICIAL COMMENTS BY COUNSEL

The Supreme Court's first exploration of the problems presented
by extrajudicial comment by counsel in pending litigation occurred in
In re Sawyer.01 In Sawyer, the Court reviewed the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of an order of the Supreme Court
of Hawaii suspending an attorney from the practice of law. The attorney had been charged with making a public speech which ",reflected
adversely upon [the district judge's] impartiality and fairness in the
conduct of [a Smith Act trial in which she was counsel] and impugned
his judicial integrity.""2 The State Ethics Committee, which was investigating the case, concluded that Mrs. Sawyer" 'imputing to the Judge
unfairness in the conduct of the trial, in impugning the integrity of the
local Federal courts and in other comments'. . . , was guilty of violation
57.

State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Wis. 1948).

58. Id. at 311-12.

See also Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d

502, 505 (4th Cir. 1963); Schuster v. Bowen, 347 F. Supp. 319, 321 (D. Nev. 1972);
Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1968).

59. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
60. The test was conceived as a test of the sufficiency of the evidence in certain
types of cases. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951).
61. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
62. Id. at 624-25.
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of Canons 1 and 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Ameri"063
can Bar Association ....
These findings were submitted to the Hawaii Supreme Court, which
held that Mrs. Sawyer had willfully engaged in a verbal attack upon
the administration of justice and had impugned the presiding judge's
integrity. The Hawaii court found that, as a result of the statements,
Mrs. Sawyer was guilty of" 'gross misconduct.' "64
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion, which reversed, was expressly limited to the narrow question of whether the facts abduced were
capable of supporting the findings that the petitioner's speech had impugned the district judge's impartiality and fairness in conducting the
Smith Act trial and thus reflected upon his integrity in the dispensation
of justice in that case.0 5 Justice Brennan noted 'that he was dealing
with the Hawaii court's findings, not with "misconduct" in the abstract. He carefully explained that
[s]ince no obstruction or attempt at obstruction of the trial was
charged 66 and since it is [clear] . . . that the finding upon which
the suspension rests is not supportable by the evidence adduced,
[there is] no occasion to consider the applicability of Bridges v.
California,...

Pennekamp v. Florida,...

or Craig v. Harney

67

Hence, the plurality opinion neither "reach[ed] [n]or intimate[d] any
conclusion on the constitutional issues presented. 68 Justices Black and
Stewart concurred separately. 9
After carefully reviewing the evidence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
his dissenting opinion, concluded that the charges against the petitioner were amply proved. What is significant about his opinion,
however, is its peroration in which four Justices made it luminously
clear that the first amendment rights of a lawyer who is participating
in on-going litigation are vastly different from those of a private citi63. Id. at 625 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 626.
65. Id. at 626.
66. Id. at 626.
Remarks made during the course of a trial might tend to such obstruction where
remarks made afterwards would not. But this distinction is foreign to this case,
because the charges and findings in no way turn on an allegation of obstruction
of justice, or of an attempt to obstruct justice, in a pending case.
id. at 636.
67. Id. at 626-27.
68. Id. at 627.
69. Id. at 646.
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zen or a newspaper. With characteristic brilliance Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke to the problem under consideration here:
The problem raised by this case-is the particular conduct in
which this petitioner engaged constitutionally protected from the
disciplinary proceedings of courts of law?-cannot be disposed of
by general observations about freedom of speech. Of course, the
free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite of
a free society. And freedom of thought is meaningless without
freedom of expression. But the two great justices -to whom we
mostly owe the shaping of the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech, Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, did not
erect freedom of speech into a dogma of absolute validity nor
enforce it to doctrinaire limits. Time, place and circumstances
determine the constitutional protection of utterance. The First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as it protects freedom of speech, are no exception to the law of life
enunciated by Ecclesiastes: "For everything there is a season,
and a time for every purpose under heaven," And one of the
instances specifically enumerated by the Preacher controls our
situation: "[A] time to keep silence, and a time to speak."
Eccles. 3:1, 7. Of course, a lawyer is a person and he too has
a constitutional freedom of utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of justice. But a lawyer actively participating in a trial, particularly an emotionally charged
criminal prosecution, is not merely a person and not even merely
a lawyer. If the prosecutor in this case had felt hampered by
some of the rulings of the trial judge, and had assailed the judge
-forsuch rulings at a mass meeting, and a conviction had followed,
and that prosecutor had been disciplined for such conduct according to the orderly -procedure for such disciplinary action, is it
thinkable that this Court would have found that such conduct by
the prosecutor was a constitutionally protected -exercise of his
freedom of speech, or, indeed, would have allowed the conviction
to stand?
It is difficult enough to seal the court-room, !as it were, against
outside pressures. The delicate scales of justice ought not to be
willfully agitated from without by any of the participants responsible for the fair conduct of the trial.
It is hard to believe that this Court should hold that a member of the legal profession is constitutionally entitled to remove
his case from the court in which he is an officer to the public
and press, and express to them his grievances against the conduct
of the trial and the judge. "Legal trials," said this Court, "are
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not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall,
the radio, and the newspaper." [Citation omitted.]
Even in the absence of the substantial likelihood that what was
said at a public gathering would reach -the judge or jury, conduct
of the kind found here cannot be deemed to be protected by the
Constitution. An attorney actively engaged in the conduct of a
trial is not merely another citizen. He is an intimate and trusted
and essential part of the machinery of justice, an "officer of the
cotrt" in the most compelling sense. He does not lack for a
forum in which to make his charges of unfairness or failure to
adhere to principles of law; he has ample chance to make such
claims to the courts in which he litigates. As long as any tribunal
bred in the fundamentals of our legal tradition, ultimately this
Court, still exercises judicial power those claims will be 'heard and
-heeded.70
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the result only because he believed
the judgment was not supported by the evidence. 7' However, his
carefully worded opinion leaves the unmistakable impression that he
agreed with the principles articulated in the dissent:
If, as suggested by my Brother Frankfurter, there runs through
the principal opinion an intimation that a lawyer can invoke the
constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from
even-handed discipline for proven unethical conduct, it is an intimation in which I do not join. A lawyer belongs to a profession
with inherited standards of propriety and honor, which experience
has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment
of justice. He who would follow that calling must conform to
those standards.
Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from
what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected
speech.7'

These views, coupled with those of the Sawyer dissenters, make it
apparent that five Justices have renounced clear and present danger
as a standard to test the propriety of extrajudicial comments by lawyers during pending litigation.
An examination of the en banc decision in Sawyer is most edifying. 7 While the circuit court's factual finding that the evidence
supported the charge against Mrs. Sawyer was overturned by the Supreme Court, its 4 to 3 determination that clear and present danger and
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 666-69.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 646-47. See also State v. Nielsen, 136 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Neb. 1965).
In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958).
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Bridges were inapplicable to cases involving extrajudicial comments
by lawyers involved in pending litigation was left undisturbed. 74 In-

deed, as noted earlier, five Justices appeared to have given it their
imprimatur.
Years earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had im-

plicitly recognized that the free speech rights of counsel of record had
unique parameters. The background for this important pronouncement was an inauspicious reorganization in bankruptcy. 75 The trustee
had petitioned the court to enjoin appellant and others from communicating with the creditors of the debtor or the shareholders of the

corporation organized to receive the assets of the debtor. The appellant violated the order and was held in contempt.

On appeal, he

argued that the "order [was] void because it violated the right of
free speech.

76

Mr. Justice (ther Circuit Judge) Minton, speaking

for a unanimous panel, unhesitatingly rejected the first amendment
77
argument.
74. In the majority opinion, Judge Chambers said:
Far different, is this from the contempt cases of the Times-Mirror with its editorials and Bridges with his telegram. This is not a contempt case. The Times
and Bridges were not court officers charged with the duty of keeping the temple
clean. Nor was this a case of a lawyer unconnected with the case commenting
at a public meeting or a lawyer who had carried his case past the point of decision, now carrying his cause to the people. Nor was it private grousing among
friends to which we assume all lawyers are entitled when legal events are not going their way. It was a public meeting.
We reject the clear and present danger rule of third party contempts which is
called upon in Bridges v. State of California. How could we accept the notion
that before a lawyer in the very same case could be disciplined his voice would
have to rise to a mighty cacophony reaching the point of causing the audience
(a clear and present danger) to march on the courthouse, or to set up such a howl
that the judge would be terrified? Maybe for others, but not for counsel of record.
Nor is this a case for a lawyer under strain making an ill-advised speech who
later in calmer moments appreciates his error and is humble about it. Respondent
is adamant that she only exercised her constitutional right. So, on that she stands
or falls. In our view, she falls.
Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
75. In re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp., 129 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 670 (1942).
76. Id. at 176.
77. Speaking for a unanimous panel, Judge Minton stated:
mhe right of free speech . . . is a relative right that may be modified in its
interplay with the rights of others ....
The time limit argument fails to impress us. The order by its terms was to
be in effect until 'further order' of the court, and it does not purport to be permanent.
As far as the phrase 'general written communications' is concerned, a study of
the pleadings which led to the order shows that the order referred to communications relating to the reorganization, not to irrelevant communications. Surely the
lower court did not intend to enter a ridiculous order, but rather an order designed
to protect the plan of reorganization.
We are not here concerned with the case of one not a party to the record; nor
with a communication not related to the reorganization; nor with a communica-
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The congruence between that order and the Kaufman and Reardon
Committees' Rules is almost perfect. In each situation, the restrictions are temporally limited to the duration of the proceeding; in each
they apply only to matters relating to the pending case; and, in each,
they are not predicated upon a wish to selectively stifle criticism or
the expression of opinion because it is offensive to certain segments
of society. 75 Rather, they are imposed solely as a means to protect
other compelling interests.
The significance of the case is the absence of any indication that
clear and present danger has any bearing on the problem. Yet,
Bridges had been decided almost seven months earlier. We cannot
lightly assume that so careful a judge as Minton, to say nothing of
Sparks and Major, was unaware of that decision. The conclusion is
inescapable that, like the five Supreme Court Justices and the four
circuit judges in Sawyer, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
did not find the ratio decidendi of Bridges applicable.
Also of considerable import is the decision of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in State v. Kavanaugh,79 which involved the revocation of F. Lee Bailey's permission to appear pro hac vice in a criminal case. The trial in which Bailey was to appear had attracted an
unusual amount of attention. 0 Shortly before the jury was to be
selected, Mr. Bailey wrote a letter to the Governor of New Jersey and
others in which he accused the state of knowingly preparing to conduct a trial based on perjured testimony. The letter was lengthy and
cleverly constructed; in essence it communicated the idea that Bailey's
clients were innocent victims of an impending miscarriage of justice.
It received wide press coverage. 8
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the trial judge to conduct a hearing to determine whether Bailey's permission to practice
pro hac vice should be revoked. After conducting the hearing, the
judge revoked the permission. 2 Relief was sought in the federal distion delivered after a final decree had been entered. We are concerned with a
party of record, against whom a proper restraining order might lawfully be directed.

Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
78. But see Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-82 (1972); Police Dept. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970);
79. 243 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1968).
80. Id. at 226.
81. The letter is set out in full in State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 226 (1968).
82. Less than two months before the hearing, the trial judge had forbidden in explicit terms any public disclosure of the alleged results of polygraph tests. The occasion was the filing of a motion in February, 1968 concerning the admissibility at
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trict court where the judge determined -that he should not resolve the
question presented until the petitioners had sought appellate review by
the appropriate state courts. 83

He did, however, intimate that he

found unimpressive the argument that Bailey was simply exercising
his first amendment rights. He stated that this "right is not so unrestricted that the exercise of it can be permitted 'to interfere with the

fair and impartial administration of justice, particularly in a case to be
tried by a jury. 8'

4

Relying on Canon 20, Judge Shaw expressed dis-

approval of "any statements made by counsel out of court for publication, . . . during the course of a judicial proceeding .... 81
The petitioners then took their case to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which, in a scathing per curiam denouncing Bailey's "gross

ethical impropriety," sustained the order of suspension, noting inter
alia, that "of even greater moment than the interest of the immediate

parties is the interest of the public in 'the integrity of the judicial process. "86

The court found that Mr. Bailey's conduct invaded that in-

87
terest and trenched upon the state's right to a fair trial.
When the case returned to the federal district court, Judge Shaw
agreed with the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court and denied the request for relief. The Court of Appeals for the Third Cir8
cuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari1
Once again
trial of polygraph tests. Having been filed with the clerk of the court, the motion became available to the press. Attached was an affidavit asserting that Mr. Bailey's clients had been given such tests. Of course, the oblique intimation was that they
passed. The press carried the story, and as a result, the trial judge, on February 28,
1968, warned all counsel that any further reference to the polygraph before a ruling
of its reliability would be conduct "prosecuted as contempt of court." Id. at 229; cf.
United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969);
Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969);
N.D. ILL. R. 107(c) [hereinafter cited as Local Rule 1.071.
83. Matzner v. Brown, 288 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D.N.J. 1968).
84. Id. at 611.
85. Id. at 611.
86. State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 231 (N.J. 1968).
87. The court reasoned that:
Mr. Bailey was free to write to anyone in the world. What he could not do was
to write with the intent, or with a reckless disregard of the high probability, that
his letter would enter the public domain if the letter would violate the ethical concepts stated in Canon 20 and expounded in State v. Van Duyne, [citation omitted].
The ban on statements by the prosecutor and his aides applies as well to defense
counsel. The right of the State to a fair trial cannot be impeded or diluted by
out-of-court assertions by him to news media on the subject of his client's innocence. The courtroom is the place to settle the issue and comments before or during the trial which have the capacity to influence potential or actual jurors to the
possible prejudice of the State are impermissible.
State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 232 (N.J. 1968).
88. Matzner v. Brown, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1015
(1970).
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there was expressed the view that clear and present danger is not a
relevant consideration in cases where extrajudicial statements are made
by counsel of record in pending litigation. Rather, such behavior is
viewed by these courts as unethical conduct simpliciter.89
THE EMERGENCE OF THE "REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD" TEST

While almost all courts have recognized the weakness of the danger
formula when applied in the context of extrajudicial comments by
counsel in pending litigation, they have not been unanimous in their
choice of substitutes. Some courts have regarded such conduct as
misconduct simpliciter; others have resorted to what has come to be
known as the "reasonable likelihood test."
While the seeds of the test may have been planted by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Sawyer,9 0 its first explicit enunciation came
in Tijerina v. United States.91 There, the district court entered an
order prohibiting the defendants, their counsel, the prosecutors and
potential witnesses from making public statements regarding the jury,
the merits of the case, or the evidence. The defendants violated the
court's order and were held in contempt. In affirming the contempt
citations, the circuit court expressly rejected the contention that the
order was invalid because it was not based on a clear and present
danger. The court quite properly recognized the impact of Sheppard
v. Maxwell and held that the "reasonable likelihood" test-not clear
and present danger-was the appropriate test in the context of extrajudicial statements by parties in on-going proceedings. 92
In the wake of Tijerina came the California Court of Appeals decision in Younger v. Smith. 93 Like Tijerina, Younger involved review of a contempt citation issued against the district attorney of Los
Angeles County. Younger had violated an order of the trial judge
which prohibited out of court statements relating to the nature, sub94
stance or effect of any testimony already given.
In the court of appeals, two other cases were consolidated with
Younger. They arose out of the entry of an order in an unrelated
89. See also State v. Nielsen, 136 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Neb. 1965). Subsequently,
the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that Mr. Bailey could not appear pro
hac vice in any case in the New Jersey State courts for one year. In re Bailey, 273
A.2d 563, 566 (N.J. 1971).
90. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
91. 412 F.2d 661, 666-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
92. Id. at 666.
93. 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973).
94. Id. at 229.
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murder case barring "the publication of any matters with respect to
the present case except as occur in open court."' 5 The order was
directed not only against the prosecution and defense but also against
"'all agencies of the public media.'"96 In separate actions, both the
Times Mirror Company and the district attorney of Los Angeles
County sought relief in the court of appeals.
The salient argument raised by the latter's petition for a writ of
prohibition centered around the clear and present danger test's application to the problem of "gag" orders against counsel of record. Relying on Tijerina, the respondent-trial judge argued that the Constitution merely required a "reasonable likelihood" that public dissemination of ,the proscribed utterances will interfere with a fair trial or the
due administration of justice. In an extensive and incisive opinion,
the court reversed the contempt citation against Younger, granted the
relief sought by Times Mirror, and denied the relief sought by the
district attorney. The court noted that the danger test "never has
been the universal solvent of First Amendment problems,"9 7 and that
the insensitive invocation of delusively simplistic formulas has never
provided adequate solutions for the comlex problems presented in
first amendment litigation.9 8 It concluded with a recognition that the
"reasonable likelihood" test is a more realistic and meaningful measure of the constitutionality of restraints on extrajudicial comments. 9
CHASE V. ROBSON:

A MISAPPLICATION

OF THE DANGER FORMULA

This apparent consistency of authority is marred by the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chase
v. Robson.10 0 Chase involved an order barring defendants, their
counsel, and counsel for the government from making statements to
the press about the merits of the case, the evidence, and similar relevant matters.' 0 1 The fifteen defendants sought a writ of mandamus
from the court of appeals. In a per curiam opinion, the laconism of
which masked the complexity and importance of the issues, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that before a trial court can
95. Id. at 231-32.
96. Id. at 231.
97. Id. at 240.
98. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
99. Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 242 (Ct. App. 1973).
100. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
101. Id. at 1060.
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limit defendants' and their attorneys' freedom of speech, "the record
must contain sufficient specific findings by the trial court establishing
that defendants' and their attorneys' conduct is a 'serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.' "102
The prior activities of the defendants and ,their counsel were held
insufficient to support "'the proposition that the defendants' future
first amendment utterances, if any, would interfere with the fair administration of the trial."' 3 It concluded that the district court had
no authority to act as it did "in the absence of a clear showing that an
exercise of those first amendment rights will interfere with the rights
of the government and the defendants for a fair trial . .
,"I" Mr.
Justice Holmes long ago observed that "[o]ne may criticize even
what one reveres."' 1 5 It is in that spirit that the following examination of the Chase decision is undertaken.
It has been rightly said that "[t]he validity and moral authority of
a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached."'0 °
Measured against this standard, Chase does not fare well. The only
authorities cited by the court in support of its conclusion were Craig
v. Harney'1 7 and Wood v. Georgia,10 8 neither of which involved a
protective order imposed on participants in a pending criminal case-a precedental limitation stressed by the Supreme Court in Wood:
First, it is important to emphasize that this case does not represent a situation where an individual is on trial: there was no
"judicial proceeding pending" in the sense that prejudice might
result to one litigant or the other by ill-considered misconduct
aimed at influencing the outcome of a trial or grand jury proceeding .

.

.

. Moreover, we need not pause here to consider

the variant factors that would be present in a case involving a
petit jury. Neither Bridges, Pennekamp nor Harney involved
a trial by jury. In Bridges it was noted that "trials are not like
elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the
radio, and the newspaper" [citation omitted] and of course the
limitations on a free speech assume a different proportion when

102. Id. at 1061. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has concluded that a hearing
is not required before a court can invoke a protective order. In re Kinlein, 292 A.2d
749, 757 (Md.Ct. App. 1972).
103. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970).
104. Id. at 1061.
105. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H~Av. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897).
106. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 225-26 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
107. 331 U.S.367 (1947).
108. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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expression is directed toward a trial as compared to a grand jury
investigation.10 9

10
Although this passage from Wood was pointed out to the court,

the opinion treated the problem by ignoring it."'

Overshadowing

the opinion's mishandling of precedent, however, is its internal inconsistency.
The capacity of an utterance to interfere with the fair administra-

tion of justice is manifestly an intrinsic function of the statement itself, wholly unrelated to any prior conduct of the speaker.

That is,

a statement is prejudicial, vel non, not because the speaker has done
something in the past but rather because its content is of a particular
nature." 2 Yet, the plain language of Chase inexplicably posits some
109. Id. at 389-90 (emphasis added; see People v. Goss, 141 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Il.
1957).
110. Brief for Respondent at 22, Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
111. The late Karl Llewellyn has branded such a "technique" as "flatly illegitimate."
K. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 86 (1960). It is not
suggested that the court's "mishandling" of precedent was intentional. It seems more
likely that the procedural posture in which the case came to the court demanded too
rapid a decision in light of the complexity of the issues. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's "reservation" in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956) puts the problem in proper perspective:
mhe judgments of this Court are collective judgments. They are neither solo
performances nor debates between two sides, each of which has its mind quickly
made up and then closed. The judgments of this Court presuppose full consideration and reconsideration by all of the reasoned views of each. Without adequate
study there cannot be adequate reflection. Without adequate reflection there cannot be adequate deliberation and discussion. And without these, there cannot be
that full interchange of minds which is indispensible to wise decision and its persuasive formulation.
Id. at 485. See also Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term Forward: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84 (1959).
Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Cole was one of the government counsel in Chase,
it would be disingenuous not to acknowledge that the court received little assistance
from either the government or the defendants. Yet, the history of mutual dependence
between bench and bar characterizes Anglo-American jurisprudence. ["Shall I ask what
a court would be, unaided? The law is made by the Bar, even more than by the
Bench." O.W. HOLMES, The Law, in COLLECTED SPEECHES 16 (1931).] This interdependence imposes on members of the bar the responsibility of thoroughly and fully
presenting their views to a court, for "[a] judge rarely performs his functions adequately unless the case before him is adequately presented." Brandeis, The Living
Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 470 (1916). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 30-31 (1960).
We do not mean to suggest that a court is helpless unless it is assisted by counsel.
On the contrary, frequently "the contentions of counsel cannot be counted upon to present the issues in their full dimension." Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 13. HARv. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959). What we do
suggest is that in view of the ever expanding dockets which necessarily limit the amount
of time a judge can devote to any given matter, without the initial assistance of counsel,
the court's job is made infinitely more difficult.
112. But see Frazier v. Cupp. 394 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1969).
(Prosecutor's mental
state not controlling in determining whether certain remarks are prejudicial).
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sort of unexplained causal nexus between past conduct and the capacity of an utterance to prejudice a fair trial.
The opinion either ignored or failed to realize that it is precisely
because certain kinds of extrajudicial comments are gravid with prejudice when made in the context of pending litigation that they can be
prospectively proscribed." 3 It is folly to suggest that a district judge
cannot prohibit the participants in a trial from making statements
about the guilt or innocence of a defendant, tho witnesses in the
case, the evidence and other matters of this kind until he has a basis
for ascertaining that they are going to be made. The simple fact is
that counsel have no right to make such statements with reference to
pending litigation because, by virtue of their intrinsic nature and the
circumstances under which made, they constitute a very real, substantial and imminent threat to the administration of justice. And it
is a pernicious doctrine which requires a district judge to stay his
,,I"
hand "until the putsch is about to be executed ...
But the singular failing in the opinion is its mechanistic application
of the danger formula "without regard ,to the context of its applica,n""' As noted
tion" or "the considerations that gave [it] birth .
earlier, Holmes considered that the interest which the first amendment
was designed to protect presupposed that the dominant opinion prevailing at any given time may be wrong and the most effective way
to correct it is freedom of criticism and protest." 6 For him, "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
"..,
It was "[o]nly the emergency
competition of the market . .
that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil
counsels to time . . ."I's that justified punishment of expressions of
opinion and exhortations. "If there be [sufficient] time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.""' 9 "That at any rate is the theory of our Constitu113. Local Rule 1.07 and the rules of the Kaufman and Reardon Committees pro-

scribe only those utterances which experience has demonstrated are prejudicial.

See

ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE 1.07 (1970); Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL L.
REv. 197, 198 n.5 (1962).
114. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
115. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950).
116. See pp. 352-53, supra.

117. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(emphasis added).
118. Id. at 630.
119. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)

(Holmes, J., dissenting)

(Brandeis, Holmes, JJ., con-

curring).
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tion." 2 o
But "the theory of our Constitution" with reference to criminal
trials rests on entirely different presuppositions. "The very word
'trial' connotes decisions on the evidence and arguments properly advanced in open court. Trials are not like elections, to be won through
the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.' 121 The
theory of our system, as applied to criminal litigation abhors, "the
competition of the market" as Mr. Justice Holmes himself acknowledged over half a century ago in his opinion in Patterson v. Colorado.1 22 That opinion expressed what Sheppard v. Maxwell itself
described as "[tihe undeviating rule of the Supreme Court . . .,.
A publication likely to reach the eyes of a jury, declaring a
witness in a pending cause a perjurer, would be none the less
a contempt that it was true. It would tend to obstruct the administration of justice, because even a correct conclusion is -not to
be reached or helped in that way, if our system of trials is to
be maintained . The theory of our system is that the conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and

argument in open court, and not 124by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print.
Finally, the opinion was in error in suggesting that the "reasonable

120. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (Holmes, J.,dissenting).
121. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941); accord, Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
122. 205 U.S.454 (1907).
123. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966).
124. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). See also Turner v.Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965). It cannot be argued that Schenck sapped Patterson's
precedential capacity. Quite apart from the fact that the two opinions are mutually
consistent, Mr. Justice Holmes never so much as indicated that Patterson was either
wrongly decided or sub-silentio overruled. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 388
(1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
Moreover, Patterson has been cited approvingly and relied on in numerous occasions
following Schenck and Bridges. See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364
(1966); Estes v.Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551 (1965). In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966) the Court itself quoted from Patterson in the same breath that it cited
Pennekamp, Bridges and Harney. Id. at 351. See also, United States v. McKinney,
429 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1970); Silverthorne v.United States, 400 F.2d 627, 637
(9th Cir. 1968); People v.Goss, 141 N.E.2d 385, 390 (Ill.
1957).
In the last analysis, itseems as though Chase fell prey to what Mr. Justice Cardozo
once described as the "tyranny of labels:"
A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels.
Out of the vague precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment a court frames a rule
which is general in form, although it has been wrought under the pressure of particular situations. Forthwith another situation is placed under the rule because it
is fitted to the words, though related faintly, if at all, to the reasons that brought
the rule into existence.
Snyder v.Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934) (emphasis added).
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likelihood" test of Tijerina was a "lesser standard"' 25 than clear and

present danger, for the Supreme Court has never "'fixed the standard
by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how
remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present.' ,,126Nor has
the Court ever indicated that the clear and present danger test precludes proscription
of speech which, because of its "nature" and the
"circumstances"' 1 7 in which it is uttered, is reasonably likely to bring
about a substantial evil. Actually, the opinions point in an opposite
8
direction.

12

Obviously the contamination of actual or prospective jurors in a
criminal case is as grave and serious an evil as can be envisaged.
Moreover, bitter experience attests to the devitalizing capacity possessed by lawyers' extrajudicial comments to news media about the merits
of a case. Thus, since all that is required under the danger test is
that speech must be shown "likely" to produce an extremely serious
"evil that rises . . . above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest,"' 29 it obviously follows that a rule which requires a showing of
"reasonable likelihood" of prejudice to "actual or imminent" litigation
satisfies clear and present danger even in its pristine form.
Moreover, we believe the reasonable likelihood test best accords
with the principles articulated in the prejudicial publicity cases.
Those cases require that a defendant merely show a "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice to obtain -reversal.'8 0 If in order to safeguard
the right of a fair trial, convictions are to be reversed on a showing
that publicity likely or probably affected the outcome, attempts by rule
to forestall such prejudice must be judged by the same standard. This
ineluctably follows once it is realized that any other rule would leave
reversals of convictions as the only effective curatives. Yet in Shep125. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970).
126. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941).
127. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
128. In sum, the Supreme Court has looked to the "extent [that] the substantive
evil of unfair administration of justice was a likely consequence, and whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify summary punishment." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). It has noted that the first amendment does not permit
a state to outlaw the willful advocacy of the violation of law except where such advocacy is "likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969). Thus, freedom of speech is protected "unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest .... ." Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237
(1963), quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
129. Id. at 237.
130. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 542 (1965).
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pard, the Court emphasized -that remedial measures rather than reversals are what will prevent the problem of prejudice.''
THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR SHOWING OF CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER
32
Nothing in Bridges v. California,1
Pennekamp v. Florida,3'
Craig v. Harney, 3 4 or Wood v. Georgia,'35 is contrary to the principles enunciated earlier. In Bridges the petitioner was found guilty
of contempt of court for publishing in newspapers comments pertaining to a matter which was awaiting decision by a judge. At the
outset, the Court noted that the legislature of California had not previously determined what action should be taken by courts with regard to publications outside of -the courtroom which commented upon
a pending case. It realized that in the absence of such appraisal ,that
" 'it must necessarily [find] as an original question that the specified
publications involved created, such likelihood of bringing about the
substantive evil as -to deprive [them] of the constitutional protec-

tion.' """ However, it also acknowledged that "such a 'declaration
of . . . policy would weigh heavily in -any challenge of the law as

infringing constitutional limitations.' ,,'37
What is most significant about Bridges is its recognition that where
the legislative branch of the government, after due deliberation, has
found a sufficiently grave and imminent danger to warrant proscription of a particular kind of utterance, review of a conviction for violating -that statutory proscription will differ greatly from review of a
contempt conviction, based as it is on a common law concept of the
most general and undefined nature. 38 As will be seen, the implications of this statement to the problem of restrictions on lawyers' comments are extraordinary.
In Craig v. Harney,"3 9 the Court was careful to point out that
neither Bridges, Pennekamp nor Craig itself raised "questions con131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
328 U.S. 331 (1946).
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
370 U.S. 375 (1962).
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1941); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379

U.S. 536, 563-64 (1965). See also State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305 (Wis. 1948).
137. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
138. Id. at 260-61. See also Chicago Counsel of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp.
689 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
139. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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cerning the full reach of the power of the state to protect the administration of justice by its courts."'4 0 The Court's most recent attempt to define the limitations upon the contempt power when it is
employed to punish out of court publications relating to a pending
case was in Wood v. Georgia.4 ' There a county sheriff issued a
press release condemning the action of a local judge who had instructed a regularly empaneled grand jury, in the midst of a local
political campaign, to conduct an investigation into the voting patterns and habits of Negro voters in Bibb County, Georgia. These
statements were made by petitioner in his capacity as a private citizen
and not as sheriff of the county during a generalized investigation. 4 The Court took preliminary pains to point out that the judgment
of conviction under consideration was identical to that presented in
Bridges in that neither came to the Court strengthened by prior legislative deliberation. With this preface, the holding was that
when the grand jury is performing its investigatory function
into a general problem area, without specific regard to indicting
a particular individual, society's interest is best served by a
thorough and extensive investigation, and a greater degree of disinterestedness and impartiality
is assured by allowing free expres43
sion of contrary opinion.1
The Court vividly perceived that the problem differed toto coelo
from that which would be presented by a situation involving comments made during pending litigation since "limitations on free speech
assume a different proportion when expression is directed toward a
44
trial as compared to a grand jury investigation.'
Far from undermining the constitutional base of the Reardon and
Kaufman Committees' rules, Bridges, Wood, Craig, and Pennekamp
compel a finding of facial constitutionality. First, each of those cases
was concerned with defining the permissible limits upon the scope of
the contempt power, "which is 'based on common law concepts of the
most general and undefined nature.' """
None dealt with the violation of a narrowly drawn rule, regulation, or statute which seeks to
accommodate conflicting constitutional interests.
140. Id. at 373.
141. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
142. Id. at 382.
143. Id. at 388-92. Where an investigation ceased to be generalized and is directed
against a particular individual, a different question would be presented. See Doss v.
Lindsley, 53 F. Supp. 427, 433 (E.D. Ill.
1944), a! 'd, 148 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1945).
144. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1962).
145. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559, 564 (1965).
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Indeed, in both Bridges and Wood, the Court strove to demonstrate that the problems inherent in reviewing convictions in cases of
contempt for publication differed drastically from those which would
be present had the judgment been based upon the violation of a statute, where prior legislative deliberation provided direction. And the
Court expressly stated in Wood that it did not there, nor had it ever,
"found it necessary to determine the full power of the State to protect
146
the administration of justice by use of the contempt power.'
The Kaufman and Reardon Committees' rules rest upon findings
stemming from vast quasi-legislative investigation. They are supported by countless judicial precedents attesting to the miasmatic effects which result from prejudicial publicity stemming from the unregulated conduct of counsel for both the prosecution :and defense.
These rules do indeed come encased in the armour wrought by prior
1 47
legislative deliberation.
In Cox v. Louisiana,14 the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction
for violation of a Louisiana statute proscribing picketing or parading
near courthouses. Speaking in purposeful generalities, the Court
acknowledged that "a State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is
free from outside control and influence.""' The argument that the
absence of the clear and present danger test of Bridges and Pennekamp rendered the statute facially unconstitutional was rejected as inapplicable since the statute under review was narrowly drawn, and
designed to punish specific conduct which the legislature had found
to be inherently inimical to the administration of justice. 150
146. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 385 n.8 (1962).
147. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
149. Id. at 562.
150. Mr. Justice Goldberg replied:
Both these cases dealt with the power of a judge to sentence for contempt persons who published or caused to be published writings commenting on judicial proceedings. .

.

.

Here we deal not with the contempt power-a power which is

'based on a common law concept of the most general and undefined nature .... '
Rather, we are reviewing a statute narrowly drawn to punish specific conduct that
infringes a substantial state interest in protecting the judicial process.
Even assuming the applicability of a general clear and present danger test, it is
one thing to conclude that the mere publication of a newspaper editorial or a telegram to a Secretary of Labor, however critical of a court, presents no clear and

present danger to the administration of justice and quite another thing to conclude
that crowds, such as this, demonstrating before a courthouse may not be prohibited

by a legislative determination based on experience that such conduct inherently
threatens the judicial process. We, therefore, reject the clear and present danger

argument of appellant.
Id. at 563-66.
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Second, the Kaufman and Reardon Committees were dealing with
the conduct of lawyers in pending jury cases and not that of news-

papers or private citizens in cases involving a judicial officer. 5 ' The
151. Although most objections to the Rules focus directly on the first amendment, a
frequently heard variant is the argument that they do not pertain solely to jury trials.
While such a rule would be consonant with constitutional strictures it appears that
Local Rule 1.07(d) and the corresponding rules of the Kaufman and Reardon Committees upon which they are based apply only to jury trials.
The wording of the proposed rules demonstrates a preoccupation that actual and prospective jurors not be exposed to statements by the attorneys involved in the case. Section (a), which states the general principle, and the succeeding sections all refer to
dissemination by means of public communication. The emphasis on public communication is surely misplaced if the rules were intended to apply to bench trials, for there
are numerous other avenues by which a judge is inevitably exposed to that information
at which the rule is expressly directed. For example, information concerning a defendant's prior criminal record would normally come to the trial judge's attention at arraignment if there were any discussion concerning bond. Information relating to any
statement or confession made by the defendant would come to the trial judge's attention
at any suppression hearing which might be held.
Similarly, the results of any examination or test would, of course, come to the trial
judge's attention during pretrial procedures, as would the possibility of a plea. The references to such matters in section (c) demonstrate clearly that the rules are concerned
solely (except for section e) with the danger of influencing juries. But, of course,
sections b and c, dealing with pretrial stages, before it is known whether a jury will
be waived, must be phrased to cover all criminal cases.
When a case reaches trial, however, it is known whether there will be a jury, and
the rule may be more specific. Accordingly, the language of section (d) of the rules
leaves no room for doubt concerning its application. That section states that "during
the trial of any criminal matter, including the period of selection of the jury, no lawyer
associated with the prosecution or defense shall give or authorize any extra-judicial
" (emphasis added). The inclusion of the emphasized lanstatement or interview ....
guage, without any qualifications for cases in which no jury would be selected demonstrates unmistakably that the authors of the rule conceived that it should apply only
to jury trials.
The concern of the Court in Sheppard and of the Reardon and Kaufman Committees was with exposure of jurors to extra-judicial statements of counsel. The
Kaufman Committee in its report to the Chief Justice of the United States found
that the "crux of the problem" lay:
in applying simultaneously to the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts two constitutional limitations-the right of the news media to publish on
the one hand, and the right of the individual accused of the crime to a fair trial
by an impartialjury on the other.
REPORT

OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION

OF A JURY SYSTEM

ON THE "FREE

PREss-FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391, 393 (1969) (emphasis added).
That Committee began its analysis with the language of the sixth amendment which
provides for the right of speedy and public trial "by an impartial jury . . . ." The
Committee noted that the claim "that a jury trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts," had repeatedly been considered by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 394, quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Finally, the Committee stated, the Court laid down the mandate that district
courts must take steps to "insulate the jury" from the effects of publicity so that the
accused can "receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences." Id. at
396, quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (emphasis added).
Unlike section (d) of the Local Rule, section (e) is concerned with the influence
which extra-judicial statements may have upon the trial judge. This section is directed
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first amendment may demand that the latter speak out even during

the pendency of such cases; it surely makes no such requirement on
lawyers associated with the case.
THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTIONS ON EXTRAJUDICIAL COMMENTS
ON LIBERTY OF EXPRESSION

The final, but perhaps most important, point to be made concerns
the substantiality of the impact on freedom of expression which would
result from imposition of the Kaufman and Reardon rules. Where
legislation is challenged on first amendment grounds, the threshold
inquiry is the effect of the restrictions on liberty of expression. Such
was the initial inquiry in Bridges, where the Court began its discussion by considering "how much, as a practical matter, [the judgments]
would affect liberty of expression."' 5 2 The Court found that an affirmance of the judgment of contempt would allow restrictions on the
most important topics of discussion at a time when public interest
was at its height. While forcefully intimating that the judgments
would be sustained if 'their effect on liberty of expression would be insignificant, the Court found that under the facts of the case, such a
decision would necessarily result in "an endless series of moratoria on
public discussion,"'5 3 and would "close all channels of public expresat the public dissemination of matters during the period after the completion of trial
and before sentencing, if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will
affect the imposition of sentence. Significantly, the object of concern in such cases
differs from that of the other sections of the rule, which are directed at threats to the
integrity of the jury. Realization of the harm which section (e)is designed to counter
may be less likely than that which the prior sections were designed to counter. However, we believe that the Kaufman Committee was correct in including this regulation
of post-trial, pre-sentencing statements because judges, although trained in objectivity,
are still fallible. Cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). Moreover, the
sentencing process unlike the trial itself is virtually immune from appellate review so
that there is no effective means by which a defendant would press a claim that he was
prejudiced by post-trial publicity. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958);
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1932); Smith v. United States, 407
F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1969); Virgin Islands v. Turner, 409 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir.
1968); United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703-704 (4th Cir. 1965). In any event,
if immunity from appellate review was not the reason why the Kaufman Committee
included a limitation on post-trial statements, it is a reason and it is enough if this
Court is "able to perceive a basis upon which the [district court] might resolve the
conflict as it did." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972); cf. Katzenbach v.Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
A very substantial argument can be made, however, that the no comment rules were
intended to apply to bench trials. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12
(1952); cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); United States v. Hamrick, 293
F.2d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 1961).
152. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941).
153. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
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sion to all matters which touch upon pending cases.""'
The Court
concluded that aA affirmance of the judgment$ would "result in a
curtailment of expression that cannot be dismissed as insignificant."'1 5
It is apparent from even the briefest survey of the problem that the

public's "right to know"' 56 is not substantially impaired by the temporally brief restrictions imposed on a participating lawyer. 1 57 Periodicals of all kinds, television, radio, and private citizens can comment on the proceedings; only one voice is stilled, and then only in
relation to comments about the case made for public dissemination,'"I
and only for the period during which the proceedings are in progress.
Thus, the Committees' rules do not result in an "endless series of

moratoria on public discussions"; 159 nor do they "close the door of
permissible public comment."' 60

When we weigh the claimed right

of free speech against the danger of the coercion and intimidation of
actual or potential jurors, 6 ' only those who find in the Constitution
154. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 270 (emphasis added). In Pennekamp, the contempt convictions of
certain newspaper officials who had published two editorials and a cartoon, critical of
action taken by a judge, was reversed. The Court's concern with the practical effect
on liberty of expression that would result were it to sustain the judgment in the case
before it is evidence by the opinion's final statement that, "to close the door on permissible public comment" to newspapers, would be disastrous, for "[w]hen that door is
closed, it closes all doors behind it." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1946).
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), it was argued that if a reporter is compelled to respond to a grand jury subpoena without a prior showing of necessity, "confidential sources . . .will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 680. In refusing to find that the first amendment interest asserted by
the newsman was outweighed by the general obligation of all citizens to appear before
a grand jury, the Court emphasized the insubstantiality on the free flow of information
that would result from its judgment. Id. at 691; see State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305,
312 (Wis. 1948). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268, 271 (1967);
American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397 (1950); Schuster v.
Bowen, 347 F. Supp. 319 (D. Nev. 1972).
While Babcock was decided under the National Labor Relations Act rather than the
first amendment, its vivifying principles apply here pari passu. This is because section
7 accords to unions a right to use private property which is even broader than that
accorded private citizens by the first amendment. See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,
407 U.S. 530, 548-49 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, in Amalgamated
Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court
noted that the "restraints on picketing and trespassing approved by the Pennsylvania
courts here substantially hinder the communication of the ideas which petitioners seek
to express .......
Id. at 323 (emphasis added); cf. Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079,
1084 (10th Cir. 1972). See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
156. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
157. See Chicago Counsel of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
15,8. Private communications are not, of course, affected. In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d
189, 199 (9th Cir. 1958); State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 232 (N.J. 1968); Local
Rule 1.07(d).
159. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941).
160. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1946).
161. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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a "single supreme simplicity"'16 2 capable of solving the all of life's
intractible problems, can suggest that the restraints imposed are unreasonable or that they have a substantial effect on freedom of expression.
Liberty is an attractive theme; but it does not press strongly for
recognition when pleaded in utter disregard for the rights of others. 6 '

One kind of liberty may cancel and destroy another, and restrictions,
vexatious if viewed alone, may be necessary in the long run to establish
the equality of position in which true liberty begins.'
In short, the
"free speech" people would do well to keep before them the Supreme Court's admonition that the first amendment does not embrace
the "'right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of those governmental
duties upon the performance of which the freedom of all . . . de-

pends.' "165
There are, perhaps, a small number of "free speech" people who
will concede, at least arguendo, that balancing is a legitimate endeavor.
They nonetheless insist that the Readon and Kaufman Committees
have struck an unfair balance and have relegated lawyers to "second
class" citizens.' 66 Such an argument proceeds on the unarticulated
assumption that the parameters of constitutional rights are the same,
semper ubique et ab omnibus. However, the whole history of constitutional adjudication demonstrates that "rights must be judged in the
context and not in vacuo."''1 Or, as Mr. Justice Holmes compendiously phrased it in the very case in which clear and present danger
was born, "[t]he character of every act depends upon 'the circumstances
68
in which it was done.'1
162. Toynbee, Two Kinds of Extremism, London Observer, Feb. 8, 1959, at 20, col.
FREUND, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE
158 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
163. In its amicus brief in In re Oliver, 470 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1972), the Chicago
Counsel of Lawyers argued that before a participating lawyer's comments can be regulated, a court should give thought to using the "less drastic" alternative of sequestration.
At bottom, this is but a selfish assertion that the rights of twelve citizens to travel,
to associate, to speak, to work and to enjoy the manifold liberties secured to them by
the Constitution must be subordinated to a lawyer's "right" to comment on pending
cases. Id. at 17-18.
164. Coopage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165. Branzburg v. Hayes, 409 U.S, 665, 692 (1972), quoting Toledo Newspaper Co.
v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918).
166. The Canons of Judicial Ethics preclude judges from making public comments.
Yet, it has never been suggested that anyone considers them "second class citizens."
See Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 n.27 (Ct. App. 1973).
167. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 303 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
168. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

5-6, quoted in P.
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CONCLUSION

To the founders of our Republic, repression of thought and speech
were vivid and portentious evils. Indeed, the mad and melancholy
record of man's upward movement from savage isolation to organic

social life attested to ,the awful truth 'that those societies which had
found it expedient to stifle criticism and persecute the expression of
"unorthodox" opinion had suffered first, ennui, and then, 'total de-

cay. 6 '

Sensitive to the disquieting reminders of history, 170 they fash-

ioned the first amendment primarily to assure the unfettered inter" '
change of ideas for the bringing about of political change.17

While no one can deny that freedom of speech must be nurtured

if a democratic society is fairly to aspire to continued vitality, it is
likewise beyond dispute that that privilege, like all others, is not irrecusable; it has its seasons.'17
"It is a relative right that may be
modified in its interplay with the rights of others .... ,,173 And the
"fact that dissemination of information and opinion on questions of
public concern is ordinarily a legitimate, protected and indeed cherished activity does not mean, however, that one may in all respects
carry on that activity exempt from sanctions designed to safeguard
the legitimate interests of others."' 174 On the contrary, allowing even
169. See H. LAsKI, A

GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 120-21 (3d ed. 1934).
170. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41
(1943).
171. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); United States v. United States
District Court for E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n Inc. v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970); ,Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Bond
v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135 (1966); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940).
See also MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONsTrruTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 75 (1960). Of course, the first amendment
does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized
as political. 'Great secular causes, with small ones are guarded. The grievances
for redress . . . are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free
speech. . . are not confined to any field of human interest.'
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
172. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
173. In re George F. Nord Building Corp., 129 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 670 (1942).
174. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967); see Healey v. James,
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the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the first amend-

ment would not warrant treating its principles as a promise that people
who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional

right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That
has been vigorously and forthrightly reconcept of constitutional law
175
again.
time
and
time
jected
Rather, time and setting determine the parameters of first amend-

ment freedoms. Differences in the characteristics of news media jus7
tify differences in the first amendment standards applied to them;1 1
the nature of one's "employment may properly [justify and] encom-

pass limitations upon speech that would not survive constitutional
scrutiny if directed against a private citizen . ... 177

Likewise,

one's status may justify the imposition of regulations which would be
unconstitutional if applied in other settings. For example, it has been
held that requiring grand jurors to take an oath of secrecy does not
408 U.S. 169 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Rowan v.
Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642
(1951); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Federation of Labor
v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
177 (1944) (separate opinion of Jackson, J.); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d
579, 586 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965); United States v. Peace
Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255, 262 (D.D.C. 1951); Anderson v. Sills, 265 A.2d
678 (N.J. 1970); cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1965); NLRB v. Luxuray, Inc., 123 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1941); Abbot v. Thetford,
354 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
175. E.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972).
It is a non-sequitur to say that First Amendment rights may not be regulated
because they hold a preferred position in the hierarchy of the constitutional guarantees of the incidents of freedom. This Court has never so held and indeed has
definitely indicated to the contrary. It has indicated approval of reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation by governmental authority that preserves peace, order
and tranquilty without deprivation of the First Amendment guarantees of free
speech ....
There is no basis for saying that freedom and order are not compatible. That
would be a decision of desperation. Regulation and suppression are not the same,
either in purpose or result, and courts of justice can tell the difference.
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405, 408 (1953). See also Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Food
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 36, 49 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
176. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). See also Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
177. Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 922 (1970); cf. Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
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violate their first amendment rights.' 78 Nor is it unconstitutional to
impose restrictions on prisoners 179 or servicemen' 80 which would not
pass constitutional muster if applied ,toprivate citizens.'18
The dramatic differences between children and adults justify restrictions which would be otherwise unconstitutional. Thus, limitations on movies which drive-in theatres can show may be imposed
because of children's accessibility to the surrounding area; 82 and direct restrictions may be placed on the press in reporting juvenile proceedings 8 1 which would8 4 be patently unconstitutional in the setting of
a routine criminal case.1

Notwithstanding the law's proper solicitude for the right of association guaranteed by the first amendment, 88 it is clear that the
extent of that right depends on the status of the individual asserting
it. Therefore, while a private citizen's associational rights may not
normally be infringed, a probationer may validly be restrained from
associating with "known homosexuals"'II or with members of Students for a Democratic Society. 8 7 Likewise, a probationer's right to
travel, 81 to speak, 89 and to engage in gainful employment 90 are
markedly different from that enjoyed by other citizens.
While the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to bear arms,
it is not an unconstitutional abridgment of that right to prohibit convicted felons from receiving or possessing firearms.' 9 ' While freedom of speech and religion may be the hallmarks of a vibrant society,
178. Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1939).
179. Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970); Diehl v.Wainwright, 419
F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1970).
180. Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849, 852 (D.S.C. 1969), adopted
in full and af 'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970).
181. One's status may even determine whether state libel laws can be properly applied. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
182. Chemline Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
But see Cinecom Theatres Midwest States Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297
(7th Cir. 1973). See also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972).
183. Government v. Brodhurst, 285 F. Supp. 831 (D.V.I. 1968); Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25 (1967).
184. Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 813 (4th Dist. App. 1973).
1185. Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
186. United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973).
187. United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
188. See In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 885 (lst Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
189. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
190. Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 911 (1964).
191. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971).
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the' cannot be exercised in a courtroom192 or in a school' to the
same extent as on a street or in a place of worship. Equally, the
nature of a given organization may justify imposition of regulations
which would encounter difficulties if applied elsewhere.' 9 4 And finally, even a lawyer's past associations and employment may justify
95

prohibitions on future conduct.1
In cases dealing with the free speech rights of public employees,

it has been rightly said:
it is -the nature of the employment that defines the extent to which
the otherwise protected publications of employees may be constrained. . . . The less likely it is that the public will attach

special importance to the statements made by someone in a par-

ticular position, the weaker is the argument that the state needs
special restriction[s] . . .96
The concept that the relationship between the speaker and the

audience helps to locate the parameters of the first amendment has
long been recognized by the Supreme Court.
bush Co.,19 Learned Hand said:

In NLRB v. Feder-

[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a
communal existence; and not only does ,the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport
from the setting in which they -are used, of which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important
part.198
192. In re Portland Elec. Co., 97 F. Supp. 903, 909 (D. Ore. 1947); cf. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
193; Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965).
194. Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 101 (1961).
195. United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1973) (concerning a federal
conflict of interest statute which precluded a lawyer from being involved in a proceeding if, while he was a government employee, he was in any way involved with the proceeding); cf. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972) (secrecy agreement executed by government employee not violative
of first amendment).
196. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Goldasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (where the court stressed the
"uniqueness" of appellant's position in its disposition of the case); accord, Meehan v.
Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
197. 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
198. Id. at 957. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the fact that the relationship
between a speaker and his audience may well restrict the freedom of speech which
would be enjoyed in other settings:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be
made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer's rights cannot outweigh the. equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as those rights
are embodied in Sec. 7 and protected by Sec. 8(a)(1) and the proviso to Sec.
8(p). And any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of
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A lawyer in a pending criminal case occupies a unique position.
His official character as an officer of the court carries beyond question
great weight with a jury.' 99 Moreover, it is because counsel of record
may be most familiar with the case that he may not express his opinions. It takes no master of psychology to know that the extent to
which an audience is susceptible to a speaker's views depends in
large measure on the extent to which they believe him to be familiar
with his subject matter.20 0 The law has long recognized these principles as illustrated by the Canons of Ethics proscription of in-court
expressions by counsel of -record of his private opinions about guilt or
innocence. 2 01
Comments by lawyers relating to pending cases, whether true or
false, tend to obstruct -the administration of justice, because, as noted
earlier,20 2 even a correct conclusion is not to be -reached by reliance
on out-of-court information. "The theory of our system is 'that the
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence
and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether
20 8
of private talk or public print.1
To suggest that the first amendment is not violated by the Canons
of Ethics which bar a lawyer from expressing his opinions in the
courtroom, but that it is violated by a rule which prohibits expression
of opinion for public dissemination,2 0 4 is casuistry at its worst.20 5
the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the
latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. Stating
these obvious principles is but another way of recognizing that what is basically
at stake is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship between the
employer, his economically dependent employee and his union agent, not the election of legislators or the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimately defined and where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a class freer to talk (citation omitted).
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969). References are to the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
199. Cf. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966).
200. That a jury is less likely to be influenced by opinions of the press than by
opinions of counsel has been recognized by an eminent district judge. In a speech delivered to the Mississippi State Bar Association in 1969, Judge Hubert Will of the
United State's District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sagely observed that
"all Americans grow up with a kind of slowly developing, built in, press-wise compensator." Will, A Free Press and A Fair Trial, 40 Miss. L.J. 495, 501 (1969).
201. ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-106(C)(4).

202. See p. 369, supra.
203. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
204. Local Rule 1.07(d) and the Kaufman and Reardon Committees' Rules proscribe the release of information or opinion for public communication.
It is obvious that the phrase "for dissemination" means for the purpose of dissemina-'
tion. It cannot be argued that this is an insufficient statement of the intent requirement. C. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1951); Frohwerk v. United
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If we close with some general propositions, it is not because we
are unmindful of Holmes' caution that "general propositions do not
decide concrete cases." '
Rather, "[w]hether they do or not...
depends on the strength of the conviction with which . . . they are

held. '2 0 7 No principle has commanded more passionate and undeviating loyalty by American courts than the notion that "justice,
though due the accused, is due the accuser also."20 8

Indeed, from

the atmosphere and emanations of countless opinions, there emerges
with unmistakable clarity a recognition and reaffirmation of the oftforgotten truth that in criminal prosecutions there are also rights of
public justice which are no less dear and which are entitled to no less

protection than a defendant's right to a fair trial.20 9

f those "rights"

States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 422 (1919);
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1903); Masson v. Slayton, 320 F. Supp.
669, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1970). Thus a rule banning statements made for public dissemination bans only statements made with the intent that they be publicly disseminated.
Significantly, the Kaufman Committee, which drafted the recommended rule upon
which Local Rule 1.07(d) is modeled, later decided to eliminate the intent requirement
of the rule. In its Supplemental Report, the Committee replaced the phrase "for dissemination by any" with the phrase "which a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by" [means of public communication]. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE

ON THE OPERATION

OF THE JURY SYSTEM

ON

THE "FREE PREss-FAiR

TRIAL" ISSUE, 51 F.R.D. 135, 137 (1970). The Committee made this change because
of the belief that "an objective standard of conduct is preferable to one which appears
to refer to subjective intent." Id. at 138. Thus, the Committee clearly stated its understanding that its original, proposed rule, containing the identical wording of Local
Rule 1.07(d), required a finding of intent. This subsequent expression by the Committee is "entitled to great weight" in construing the rule. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969). ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-107 also embodies
this change.
205. In the related context of United States v. Largo, 346 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1965),
Judge Swygert made manifest the contradictions inherent in such a thesis:
Mhe fact that the statements were exposed to a juror by appearance in a newspaper article rather than by another form of extrajudicial communication is unimportant. If the Government's attorney or the agent had made the same statements
as were contained in the newspaper article in the corridor of the courthouse and
within the presence and hearing of juror Archer, it could hardly be said that the
effect would have been less pernicious.
Id. at 357 (Swygert, J., dissenting); cf. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
206. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
207. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
208. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
209. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82, (1973);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
721 n.18 (1969); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 197 (1953);
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 24 (1952); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 149 (1936); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934); Beaves v. Hambert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905); Reagan v.
United States, 157 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1895); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
243 (1895); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894). Even civil proceedings between "private" litigants are affected with a public interest. New York
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are to be preserved, it is imperative that restrictions on counsel's lib210
erty of expression have bilateral application.

Central R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 (1929). See also United States v. Bohle,
445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362, 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054 (1970);
United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969); Matzner v. Davenport, 228 F. Supp. 636, 639 (D.N.J. 1968); Matzner v. Brown,
288 F. Supp. 608, 611-12 (D.N.J. 1968), affd, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1015 (1970); State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 231 (N.J. 1968);
Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ky. 1968); Sun Oil Co. v. Superior Court,
105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1973). Chicago Counsel of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp.
689 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
210. Typical of the arguments levelled against the rules barring comments by defense counsel is that found in the appendix to the amicus brief of the Chicago Counsel
of Lawyers in In re Oliver, 470 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1972). The Counsel found Local
Rule 1.07(d) objectionable because it "sweeps across the whole range of extra-judicial
statements, precluding those which . . . may even assist a criminal defendant as well
as those which are prejudicial." This argument overlooks the fact that the government
as well as a defendant is entitled to a fair trial.
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